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Abstract
This paper investigates the potential for a carbon tax to induce R&D, and for
the consequent induced technical change (ITC) to lower the macroeconomic cost of
abating carbon emissions. ITC is modelled within a general equilibrium simulation of
the U.S. economy by the effects of emissions restrictions on the level and composition
of aggregate R&D, the accumulation of the stock of knowledge, and the industry-level
reallocation and substitution of intangible services derived therefrom. Contrary to
other authors, I find that ITC’s impact is large, positive and dominated by the latter
“substitution effect”, which mitigates most of the deadweight loss of the tax.
JEL Classification: O33, Q25, C68
Keywords: Induced technical change; Climate-change policy; Computable general equi-
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1 Introduction
Ever since Hicks’s articulation of the induced invention hypothesis (IIH) that price changes
affect the rate and direction of technological advance, economists have tried unsuccessfully
to put theoretical and empirical flesh on its conceptual skeleton.1 Nevertheless, despite the
∗This paper is an extension of the author’s PhD thesis at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. I
am grateful to Henry Jacoby, Denny Ellerman, Ernst Berndt, Mustafa Babiker, John Reilly and Dick Eckaus
for helpful discussions and comments. The responsibility for errors and omissions remains my own. This
research was supported by the Office of Science (BER), U.S. Department of Energy, Grant No. DE-FG02-
02ER63484, and by funding from the MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, which
is supported by a consortium of government, industry and foundation sponsors.
†Boston University Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Boston University Dept. of Geography
and Environment, and MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change. 675 Commonwealth
Ave., Rm. 141, Boston MA 02215. Phone: (617) 353-5741. Fax: (617) 353-5986. E-mail: isw@bu.edu.
1Hicks (1932, p. 124): ‘a change in the relative prices of factors of production is itself a spur to inven-
tion, and to invention of a particular kind—directed to economizing the use of a factor which has become
relatively expensive’. Attempts by Kennedy (1964), von Weizsacker (1965) and Ahmad (1966) to develop
this hypothesis into a theory led to a sizeable literature (for surveys, see Binswanger and Ruttan (1978)
and Thirtle and Ruttan (1987)) that after much argument and criticism (e.g. Samuelson (1965); Nordhaus
(1973)) faded from view in the 1970s.
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fact that the IIH remains more a general principle than a fully articulated theory, induced
innovation tends to be cited as a benefit of regulatory intervention, especially in the envi-
ronmental policy arena (e.g. Ashford et al. (1985) and Ashford (1994); Porter and van der
Linde (1995)).
Advocates of environmental regulation claim that forcing polluters to bear the costs
of reducing pollution induces the development of new technologies that both improve pro-
ductivity and mitigate abatement costs.2 Econometric tests of this claim at the level of
individual industries or products have yielded mixed results.3 Recent findings indicate that
environmental policies whose effects are large relative to the scale of the economy can have
a strong positive feedback on innovation (Popp, 2002b) and may actually have beneficial
economic outcomes (Popp, 2001). This paper explores the macroeconomic implications of
these findings by examining the effect of environmental policy constraints on aggregate tech-
nological progress and investigating the influence of such induced technological change (ITC)
on policy’s net welfare impact.
The motivation of the paper is to better understand the welfare implications of the
effects of climate change mitigation policies on technological progress. Carbon dioxide (CO2),
emitted in combustion of carbon-rich fossil fuels to provide energy for economic activity, is
the chief greenhouse gas (GHG) thought to cause global warming. Fossil fuels currently
lack large-scale substitutes, causing concern that CO2 emission limits will precipitate drastic
increases in energy prices and reductions in output and welfare (see, e.g. Weyant, ed, 1999).4
Climate change is thus the litmus test of ITC, because the costs of mitigation policies and
the potential for technology to alleviate them dwarf those of other environmental problems.
Technological change is perhaps the single most important source of uncertainty in fore-
casting the macroeconomic cost of limiting GHG emissions. Figure 1 illustrates that although
the direct effects of abatement on aggregate policy costs are fairly well known (I), there is
comparatively weak understanding of both the way in which abatement costs might induce
innovation (II) and the potential for the resulting technology to increase the substitution pos-
sibilities for carbon-based energy (III). Thus, a prerequisite to understanding ITC’s impact
on the optimal intertemporal program of reductions (IV), is elucidation of the net welfare
impact of the mechanisms that drive the feedback loop (II)-(III).5 This is the contribution
2The strong version of this hypothesis, which is attributed to Porter, claims that environmental regulations
have a net beneficial effect on firms’ competitiveness. For a critique, see Palmer et al. (1995).
3See Jaffe et al. (1995) and Jaffe et al. (2000).
4On the supply side, a lack of alternative fuels prevents energy producers from mitigating the additional
costs of carbon abatement incurred in the process of producing energy. Apart from switching to fossil fuels
with a lower carbon content (e.g. from coal and oil to natural gas), carbon sequestration or renewable energy
technologies are still too expensive for producers to broadly substitute them for hydrocarbons. On the
demand side, the inability to quickly change the energy using characteristics of capital or consumer durables
limits the substitution of other inputs to production and consumption as energy prices rise (Jacoby and Sue
Wing, 1999).
5There is considerable debate over the impact of technological change on the cost-minimizing trajectory
of GHG abatement. Some argue for postponing emissions cuts to allow for development of new substitution
possibilities that facilitate cheaper and more rapid abatement (e.g. Wigley et al., 1996), while others advocate
undertaking aggressive abatement to induce the development and adoption of technologies that mitigate
abatement costs (e.g. Grubb, 1997). The former “wait-and-see” approach assumes that new technology
development follows an autonomous rate of advance of which emission standards should be cognizant, while
the latter “act-now” approach assumes that technological change is both amenable to inducement and has
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of the paper.
To investigate the workings of the feedback loop (II)-(III) I capture the effects of rela-
tive price changes on innovation, changes in substitution possibilities and welfare using a
multi-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the U.S. economy. The model
numerically simulates the effects of a carbon tax on the level and composition of aggregate
R&D investment, the rate of accumulation of an aggregate stock of knowledge, and the
inter-sectoral reallocation and intra-sectoral substitution of the knowledge services derived
therefrom. The results reveal the previously unexplored role of knowledge reallocation in
the economy’s response to policy constraints.
I find that, contrary to the assumptions of simulation studies (e.g. Goulder and Matthai
(2000); Nordhaus (2002)) but consistent with econometric evidence on the pollution-innovation
link (e.g. Jaffe and Palmer, 1997), a carbon tax reduces aggregate R&D, causing a slowing
of knowledge accumulation and the rate of technical progress, and a decline in income and
output. However, at the same time the relative price effects of a carbon tax induce substan-
tial intra-sectoral substitution and inter-sectoral reallocation of knowledge inputs, enable the
economy to adjust in a more elastic manner. The consequent increase in gross input substi-
tutability on the supply side of the economy ends up mitigating the bulk of the deadweight
losses incurred by the tax. When the latter “substitution effect” is taken into account, the
impact of ITC is positive and large, implying that its role in economic adjustment may be
much more significant than previously thought.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a simple conceptual model of the
effect of pollution abatement on ITC and welfare, applies it as a framework for understanding
key empirical results on the mechanisms and impacts of ITC, and uses it to motivate the anal-
yses in the paper. Sections 3 and 4 outline the CGE model’s data base, algebraic structure
and parameter values, emphasizing representation of the mechanisms through which tech-
nical change occurs. Section 5 presents and discusses the results of the model’s numerical
simulations. Section 6 concludes.
2 Global Warming and ITC
2.1 Conceptual Framework
Induced technical change is the change in the set of substitution possibilities that is brought
about by the inventive response to changes in input prices. Consider the simple case in which
output (Y ) is generated according to a production function (Q) that is defined over a “clean”
input (C) and a “dirty” input (D), whose use generates pollution. In the neoclassical model
of production, taxing pollution increases the cost of using D and induces the producer to
shift to technological alternatives that use relatively less D and more C. The magnitude of
this shift is determined the shares of the two inputs in production, their relative prices, and
the elasticity of substitution that defines the shape of Q.
The situation of interest in this paper is more difficult to model. Here, Q does not rep-
resent the envelope of all possible technologies. Constraining emissions changes the relative
price of D, stimulating innovation that alters the shape of Q itself. Early studies of ITC
a mitigating effect on policy costs.
3
sought to capture this phenomenon by specifying a production function Y = Q(νDD, νCC)
in which dirty and clean inputs are augmented by technological coefficients νC and νD (re-
spectively) that are themselves functions of relative prices, following Kennedy (1964).6 I use
a different approach, that represents the shift in the production function through the substi-
tution of knowledge for tangible inputs.7 The intuition is that relative price changes induce
the creation of knowledge, not technical change per se. Only subsequently does technical
change arise, as the consequent increase in the quantity of knowledge shifts the envelope of
substitution possibilities among tangible inputs.
To formally summarize this intuition, consider an economy in which C and D are the
only commodities, with prices pC and pD, respectively. C and D are produced by industries
that use both commodities as inputs to production. Each industry also invests in R&D (R)
according to the inducement effect of the relative price of the dirty input to production and
the resources at its disposal for investment, which can be thought of as function of its output.
Thus, in each industry i and time period t,
(1) Ri(t) = ρi(pC(t), pD(t), Yi(t)) i ∈ C, D
ρi can be thought of as i’s “inducement function”. It is plausible to assume that ∂ρi/∂Yi > 0,
because the larger an industry the more resources it possesses for investment in R&D. The
signs of ∂ρi/∂pC and ∂ρi/∂pD are more difficult to pin down, because Yi and the relative
prices of the inputs responsible for its supply are not independent. In particular, proponents
of technology-forcing environmental regulation claim that ∂ρi/∂pD > 0, so that increasing
the price of dirty input is a signal for them to innovate. But while this may be true, it is
only half of the story. Ceteris paribus an increase in pD also raises industries’ unit costs of
production. For competitive markets to clear, rising costs must be a accompanied by a fall
in output and a reduction in the resources available for R&D. A realistic specification of ρ
should therefore allow prices to negatively affect R&D spending, slowing the rate of technical
advance.8 This is an important point that will have a significant impact on the rest of the
paper.
Over time, R&D drives the accumulation of an aggregate stock of intangible knowledge
assets H according to
(2) H˙(t) = $
(∑
i
Ri(t), H(t)
)
,
where ∂$/∂R > 0 and ∂$/∂H < 0 (e.g., the standard perpetual inventory formulation).
By modeling knowledge as a homogenous factor, equation (2) allows innovations in the
clean industry to increase productivity in the dirty industry and vice versa. In doing so it
reflects the general-purpose or analogical character of knowledge, whereby intangible assets
6See, e.g. (Smith, 1974) and (Magat 1976; 1978).
7Other studies that do this are Bovenberg and Smulders (1995) and Goulder and Schneider (1999).
8If one assumes that Yi is a function of prices this proposition is evident from the derivative of (1) with
respect to pD:
∂Ri
∂pD
=
∂ρi
∂pD
+
∂ρi
∂Yi
∂Yi
∂pD
. The first right-hand-side term, which presumably is positive,
captures the direct effect of inducement. But this may be outweighed by the second term which captures
the indirect effect of prices on research resources. Which term dominates is an empirical question.
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are capable of being cheaply re-used in different contexts, or combined in different ways so as
to be useful in entirely new contexts (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995; Weitzman, 1998).
In each period a vector of intangible knowledge services (vi) flows forth from this stock
to different industries according to the rate of return, that is determined by prices:
(3) vi(t) = ϑ(pi(t), H(t))
where ∂ϑ/∂pi, ∂ϑ/∂H > 0. The key feature of ϑ is that it treats knowledge services as a
priced factor (similar to capital input) whose inter-sectoral distribution can be shifted by
changing relative prices even if the stock of knowledge remains constant. Such treatment
of intangible services—possessing a price that can be competitively bid up in the short run,
which serves to allocate the benefits of knowledge so that its marginal product is equalized
across industries—captures the tacit, specific character of experience, which is costly to
codify or transmit outside of the context of its genesis, is in limited short-run supply, and
may be embodied in intersectorally mobile human capital or high-tech goods (Nelson and
Winter, 1982; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).
Lastly, output—to which the vector of relative prices is dual in general equilibrium (de-
noted by the symbol “⊥”)—is determined by a production correspondence defined over the
prices of clean and dirty intermediate inputs:
(4) Yi(t) = φi[vi(t); Qi(pC(t), pD(t))] ⊥ pi(t).
Qi represents each industry’s production function (with a slight abuse of notation), in which
the ability to substitute clean inputs for dirty inputs is limited. Technical change is the effect
of knowledge services on Qi, which shift the envelope of possibilities to substitute C for D
in accordance with the “meta-production function” φ.
For the purposes of climate policy D represents fossil fuels. Technical change is induced
by the influence on pD of taxes or quantitative limits on carbon emissions, which in turn
affects R&D in the C and D industries, that has a further impact the future supply of
knowledge. Induced technical change therefore results from two separate processes:
• An “accumulation effect” in which ρi and $ determine how price-induced changes
in R&D alter the rate of accumulation of the stock of knowledge and the aggregate
endowment of knowledge services, and
• A “substitution effect” in which ϑ and φi determine how prices alter the distribution
of this intangible endowment among producers so as to reduce the costs of abatement.
The framework of equations (1)-(4) is too general to serve as a full analytical model,
but its simplicity is nonetheless useful to clarify and put into perspective the contributions
of empirical studies of ITC, identify the gaps in our understanding of the operation of the
feedback loop in Figure 1, and motivate the construction of a numerical simulation that can
highlight the role of knowledge accumulation and substitution in technological adjustment
to policy constraints.
2.2 The Framework Applied: A Review of the Literature
There has been a recent spate of empirical work on the inducement of technical change by
environmental constraints, which is summarized in Table 1. The results of investigations of
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the effect of environmental policy constraints on innovation (Figure 1, link II) are mixed.
Jaffe and Palmer (1997) find that the overall rate of innovation is largely insensitive to the
cost of pollution abatement.9 Closely allied to the motivation of this paper, Newell et al.
(1999) and Popp (2002b) focus on energy (e) as a dirty input, and estimate that the elasticity
of energy-saving knowledge (He) with respect to energy prices (pe) is positive.
10 Newell et
al. (1999) also find the rate of technical change to be unaffected by energy prices, echoing
Jaffe and Palmer’s results. Lastly, Popp (2001) examines the effect of innovation on energy
use (Figure 1, link III) and finds that the elasticity of energy demand with respect to the
stock of energy-saving knowledge is negative.11
It is important to note that although the energy price impacts of carbon abatement
may induce energy-saving innovation, that does not imply that such technological change is
welfare improving. There are two reasons for this. The first is the competition for resources
among different types of research implied by Jaffe and Palmer’s results. If total inventive
effort is inelastic with respect to pD, then increased pollution-saving innovation will be
accommodated through a redistribution of industries’ R&D portfolios.12 Thus, compared to
the counterfactual case of no energy price increases, a strong response of energy technology
innovation may well result in energy-price-induced reductions in other types of innovation,
with adverse effects on aggregate knowledge accumulation and future productivity. The
second reason is that, with a pollution tax or quota, the more intensive an industry’s use
of D the higher its unit production cost, the more negative ∂Yi/∂pD becomes, and the
greater the likelihood that Ri declines. Thus, not only is the sectoral distribution of R&D
likely to change but aggregate R&D may actually decline, again lowering future productivity.
Thus, although empirical studies point to substantial scope for induced technical change at
the the level of individual sectors or technologies, the implications of this finding for the
macroeconomic cost of climate policy remains unclear.
Simulation studies of the macroeconomic effects of ITC appear to have overlooked this
fact. Goulder and Matthai (2000), Nordhaus (2002) and Popp (2002a) consider only the
inducement of energy- or carbon-saving R&D and ignore the effects of carbon constraints on
non-energy knowledge.13 This approach, which is tantamount to writing equations (2) and
9Jaffe and Palmer find that pollution abatement expenditures in a panel of manufacturing industries do
not significantly influence patenting activity, and exert only a small positive influence on R&D.
10Newell et al. find that energy prices and environmental policies positively affect the energy-saving bias
of technical change in home heating and cooling technology, but do not influence the pace of such technical
advance. Popp (2002b) shows that the flow of patent applications in energy technologies responds rapidly
to energy price increases, but that the sensitivity of patenting to such price changes is strongly influenced
by the state of technological knowledge, as evinced by the stock of energy technology patents in the U.S.
economy.
11Popp (2001) estimates that the energy savings due to the knowledge embodied in the cumulated stock
of energy technology patents account for one-third of the observed reduction in energy intensity in U.S.
manufacturing, and represent an overall positive return on the R&D investment required to generate the
relevant patents.
12Popp (2002a, p. 6) provides evidence of this for the U.S., finding that each additional dollar of energy
R&D crowds out about 40 cents worth of non-energy R&D.
13Nordhaus extends the DICE model to include R&D investment as a control variable that causes the
emission coefficient on output to decline in the presence of abatement policies. He finds that the welfare
impact of ITC is negligible, and concludes that the quantity of R&D investment is too small to make any
difference without implausibly high social returns. Similarly, Goulder and Matthai find that under a benefit-
cost criterion such as used by Nordhaus ITC does not affect the optimal tax rate but stimulates increased
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(3) as:
(2a) H˙D(t) = $ (RD(t), HD(t))
and
(3a) vi(t) =
{
ϑ(pi(t), Hi(t)) i = D
ϑ(pi(t), H i(t)) i = C
is problematic because it ignores the potential tradeoff at the aggregate level between
emission-reducing research and other types of R&D.
The only study to address these issues is Goulder and Schneider (1999), who model ITC
as an R&D spillover within a multisector general equilibrium framework.14 They find that
ITC’s welfare impact is positive but so small as to be overwhelmed by the negative effects of
emissions limits, which suggests that the net effect of Yi and pD on ρi and $ is dominated by
the reduction in output and the resources for research.15 They also show that this adverse
effect can be mitigated by removing taxes on R&D or by subsidizing research.
But Goulder and Schneider’s formulation of ITC suffers from other problems. Knowledge
accumulation occurs in all industries, but their “ITC spillover” (χ) is confined to energy
industries, which is equivalent to writing equations (2) and (3) as:
(2b) H˙i(t) = $ (Ri(t) + χi(t), Hi(t))
and
(3b) vi(t) = ϑ(pi(t), Hi(t))
with χD > 0 and χC = 0. ITC spillovers provide an extra impetus to the accumulation
of knowledge, but only in the D sector, implying that ITC within polluting industries is
somehow isolated from the accumulation and substitution of knowledge elsewhere in the
economy. There is an inconsistency here. The fact that in general equilibrium the same
relative price changes—and therefore the same signal to innovate in a particular direction
in input space—is felt by all sectors argues that χC should also be positive for consistency.
For this reason, Goulder and Schneider’s conclusion that the external benefits of R&D (as
opposed to ITC per se) justify R&D subsidies is misleading.
Finally, all these simulation studies share the characteristic of focusing on the accumu-
lation effect as the mechanism for ITC’s impact, while attenuating or ignoring the role that
abatement of carbon emissions. But they also find that under a cost-effectiveness criterion the reverse is
true: ITC has a negligible impact on the path of abatement but significantly reduces abatement costs.
14Goulder and Schneider construct a dynamic CGE model in which there are two kinds of intangible assets.
The first, “appropriable” knowledge, is the value of the additions to the knowledge stock that are captured
by the sector undertaking the research investment, where it plays the role of a fixed factor in each period.
The second, “spillover” knowledge, is the social return to the R&D performed by each industry’s constituent
firms, that increases the productivity of the entire industry by increasing the value of a Hicks-neutral shift
parameter in its production function. This productivity increase, which they define as induced technical
change, is active only in the carbon-energy and alternative-energy sectors of their model.
15This result is consistent with the econometric evidence on the productivity consequences of environmental
regulation summarized by Jaffe et al. (1995, pp. 150-153) and Jaffe et al. (2000, pp. 26-30).
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may be played by the reallocation of knowledge among sectors, i.e., the substitution effect.
This seems to arise from a mental model of the inducement process in which price increases
stimulate additional R&D, not one in which the patterns of use of existing knowledge change
in response to new relative price conditions. The rest of the paper is devoted to redressing
this imbalance. In the following sections I construct and simulate a CGE model that is
motivated by the framework of equations (1)-(4), in which emissions limits are allowed to
affect R&D and technical change broadly (i.e., without being confined to the genesis and
effects of energy- or emissions-saving innovation), and knowledge can move among sectors
in response to relative prices and differences in knowledge-energy substitution possibilities.
This latter structural characteristic, whose influence has not been explored, ends up having
a significant impact on the economy’s response to an emission tax.
3 Knowledge Accounting: An Input-Output Dataset
The first step in creating a CGE model based on equations (1)-(4) is to gather data on which
to numerically calibrate the functions ρ, $, ϑ and φ. This information is tabulated in the
form of a social accounting matrix (SAM), that is a snapshot of the economy in equilib-
rium. The primary dataset used in this study is the SAM for the U.S. in 1997. However,
these data do not separately record the necessary information on industries’ investments in
knowledge creation or their inputs of intangible services, or the size of the economy’s stock
of knowledge.16 The National Income and Product Accounts treat R&D as a current cost
of production along with intermediate input (U.S. Dept. of Commerce: Bureau of Economic
Analysis, 1994a), with the result that only a portion of each intermediate transaction re-
flects the value of physical goods and services. The remainder that reflects the value of the
knowledge associated with each activity, that must be estimated.17
The intangible components of the SAM are shown conceptually by the shaded portion of
the cells in the intermediate transactions matrix (X) in Figure 2(a). These can be thought
of as a matrix of knowledge flows Ω whose row sums are the value of industries’ intangible
investments (giR =
∑
j ωij) and whose column sums are the value of inputs of intangible
knowledge services to industries’ production (vHj =
∑
i ωij). To estimate the elements of
Ω I assume the simple limiting case shown in Figure 2(b) in which intermediate knowledge
flows are completely concentrated in knowledge-intensive industries identified by the the
shaded rows and columns.18 As shown in Table 2, the industries thus categorized are ones
16The 1997 U.S. SAM is composed of an i× j matrix X of interindustry transactions, an f × j matrix of
value-added activities V, and an i × d matrix of final demand activities G. The set indices i and j denote
industry sectors, shown in Table 2; f denotes the primary factors labor, capital, and natural resources; d
denotes the final demands consumption, investment, government, imports, exports. The SAM is constructed
from the BEA’s 92-sector “Make of Commodities by Industries” and “Use of Commodities by Industries”
tables for 1997 (U.S. Dept. of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2001) using the industry technology
assumption (for methodological details see Reinert and Roland-Holst). Its components of value added are
disaggregated using data on industries’ shares of labor, capital, taxes and subsidies in GDP published by
(U.S. Dept. of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2000a).
17This section builds on Goulder and Schneider’s procedure for generating the necessary estimates.
18This is the input-output analogue of methods that have been used to estimate the value of unrecorded
intangible components of GDP (see, e.g. Kendrick (1976) and Eisner (1989)). The alternative is to impute
values to ωij based on the shares of the value of measured R&D spending in each industry that are ap-
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whose outputs are used directly for articulating, manipulating, transmitting and applying
knowledge. By assumption, the full value of their inputs represents aggregate investment in
knowledge building, while the full value of their sales represents aggregate knowledge input.19
Thus ωij = xij if i, j ∈ target industries, and zero otherwise.
Investment in and returns to knowledge are accounted for by aggregating the elements
ωij into a single row and a single column and transferring them out of X to create an addi-
tional row of V and an additional column of G. This procedure generates an intermediate
transactions matrix X˜ that contains only physical commodity flows (x˜ij = xij − ωij ≥ 0); a
vector of intangible investment gR that represents Ω’s row totals (and the components of R
in equation 1); and a vector of intangible inputs vH that represents Ω’s column totals. As
shown in Figure 3(a), it reduces the number of sectors in the SAM (in this case from 92 to
86), but it also makes primary factors a direct input to final demands in the typically empty
southeast quadrant B—a situation for which there is no good economic interpretation. To
remedy this accounting problem the value of primary factor inputs in B are transferred back
into V, and corresponding adjustments are made to G to re-balance the SAM.20
The result, shown in Figure 3(b), is aggregated to match the 19 sectoral groupings in
Table 2, and is scaled to approximate the U.S. economy in the year 2000 using the 1997-
2000 average annual growth rate of real GDP (4.2 percent). Benchmark inputs of natural
resources are estimated as a share of capital in agriculture, oil and gas, mining, coal, and
electric power, and the inputs of capital to these industries are decremented accordingly.21
This final SAM provides the initial calibration point for the technical coefficients of the
production and demand functions of the CGE model that I describe in the next section.
Table 3 highlights the relevant features of these data. The absolute magnitude of both
R&D investments and knowledge inputs are largest in services, but R&D’s share of output
is largest in metals, paper products and general equipment, while knowledge as a share of
inputs is largest in construction, general equipment and transportation equipment. The
average return on intangible investment, measured by the ratio of industries’ knowledge
inputs to their R&D expenditures, is highest in transportation equipment, coal mining and
propriated by other industries through spillovers. This approach distributes individual industries’ research
expenditures according to the shares of their sales to other industries, on the assumption that R&D is em-
bodied in tangible goods and services (Terleckyj, 1974), or according to counts of the patents developed in
each industry that are used in other industries (Kortum and Putnam, 1997; Evenson and Johnson, 1997).
19Cf. Goulder and Schneider, who estimate gR as the columns of X that correspond to the industries
“legal, engineering, accounting and related services” and “other business and professions services except
medical”, and vH as 20 percent of the value of capital input in each sector. Although the present study
takes a liberal view of the activities that constitute investment in and returns to knowledge, it excludes
activities such as health services and pharmaceuticals whose benefits may be purely consumed.
20The total value of the input of each factor in the southeast quadrant is apportioned according to
industries’ shares of the total industry use of that factor, implying that the increment to vfj is λ
V
fj =
(vfj/
∑
j vfj)
∑
d bfd. To balance the SAM, the total value of the increment to V in each industry is allo-
cated among the elements of G according to the shares of each type of demand in the total final demand for
that industry, implying that the increment to gid is λ
G
id = (gid/
∑
d gid)
∑
f λ
V
fi.
21Shares are estimated from a range of additional sources: U.S. Dept. of Agriculture: Economic Research
Service, Resource Economics Division (1997) for arable land in agriculture; U.S. Dept. of Commerce: Bureau
of Economic Analysis (1994b) for mineral deposits in the coal, oil and gas, metal mining, and non-metal
mining industries; and U.S. Dept. of Energy: Energy Information Administration (2000) for “fixed-factor”
energy resources such as riverine flow, wind, insolation and uranium deposits in the electric power sector.
Sue Wing (2001) provides a detailed description of these data.
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owner-occupied dwellings and lowest in paper products and metals.22 Taxes on industries
that comprise knowledge constitute a three percent tax rate on knowledge and make up 2.8
percent of total tax revenue, implying that the market for R&D will suffer from distortions
in the baseline no-policy case of a model calibrated on this SAM. Inputs of knowledge
generally constitute less than ten percent of sectoral output (with the exception of the
construction, equipment and machinery sectors), shares that are similar in magnitude to
energy inputs (with the exception of the primary energy industries coal, petroleum and
natural gas). However, the dissimilar distributions of each of these inputs in the economy
imply inter-sectoral heterogeneity in knowledge-energy substitution possibilities, and create
incentives for the reallocation of knowledge services in response to carbon constraints.
Underlying the SAM’s static equilibrium flows are dynamic processes of accumulation
that expand the economy-wide stocks of capital and knowledge from their initial levels (K
and H, respectively). To calibrate the function $ I assume that the aggregate benchmark
quantities of physical and intangible investment GI and GR compensates for the depreciation
of these stocks (which occurs at rates δK and δH), expanding them at initial rates gK and gH .
The benchmark stocks of capital and knowledge that underlie the SAM are thus estimated
using the relations K = GI/(gK + δK) and H = GR/(gH + δH).
23 To calibrate the function ϑ
it is necessary to estimate the rates of interest on tangible and intangible assets (rK and rH)
that generate the payments to capital and knowledge in the SAM (V K and V H , respectively).
These are computed using the standard rate-of-return formulas rK + δK = V K/K and
rH + δH = V H/H.
24
4 ITC in a CGE Model of the U.S. Economy
I implement the system of equations (1)-(4) as a recursive-dynamic simulation of the U.S.
economy that solves for a series of static equilibria on a five-year time step from 2000 to 2100.
The core of the simulation is a static Arrow-Debreu model in which a representative agent
maximizes welfare and producing industries maximize profits subject to the technologies
of production and consumption, the economy’s endowments of primary factors and natural
resources, and existing taxes and distortions. The agent is endowed with the factors of
production whose services she leases to the industries to produce commodities, thereby
generating rental income that finances her demand for commodities for the purposes of
consumption, investment and R&D. In the model there are two kinds of assets: physical
capital and intangible knowledge, the accumulation of which is driven by the equilibrium
flows of aggregate investment and R&D (respectively) computed by the static model in each
period. Accumulation of these assets determines the expansion of the endowments of tangible
and intangible services that drives the growth of the economy over the simulation horizon.
22The former industries are the recipients of knowledge spillovers, which appropriate the benefits of the
R&D performed by the latter industries, which are the sources of spillovers.
23Based on data in U.S. Dept. of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis (2000b), δK is estimated to be
5 percent. By assumption, δH = 0, gK = 0.05 and gH = 0.1. The resulting initial values of the stocks are
18.8 trillion dollars for capital and 5.8 trillion dollars for knowledge.
24The calculated values of K and H imply that rK = 0.118, rH = 0.257, the rate of return to capital is
16.8 percent and the rate of return to knowledge is 25.7 percent. These figures imply a joint rate of return
to capital and knowledge of 18.9 percent.
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Although a forward-looking equilibrium model is the ideal test-bed for evaluating the
effects of ITC, a recursive-dynamic modelling approach was pursued because the more com-
plicated intertemporal equilibrium problem could not be solved.25 The model adopts a
Solow-Swan formulation in which the representative agent exhibits a fixed marginal propen-
sity to save and invest in capital and R&D. Consequently, the allocation of resources between
tangible and intangible investment in the simulation is based on the relative costs of these two
activities—not their relative rates of return. As a result, the model possesses no mechanism
for updating the rates of return on capital and knowledge in response to the accumulation
of these assets or the relative price effects of emissions limits.
4.1 Production
Each industry j maximizes profit (pij) subject to the constraint of its production technology
(φj), by allocating its inputs of intermediate goods and factors (xj and vj) to produce output
(Yj), given their prices (p˜
A, w and pj, respectively, where p˜
A is gross of commodity taxes):
(5) max
xj ,vj
pij[pjYj, p˜
A · xj,w · vj] s.t. Yj ≤ φj(xj,vj)
Following Goulder and Schneider, the φjs are nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
functions, shown in Figures 4(a)-4(c). The substitution elasticities at each level of the nesting
hierarchy differ in value by industry, as shown in Table 5.
Figure 4(a) shows the basic nesting structure, which obtains in manufacturing and service
sectors. Knowledge services vHj substitute for an aggregate of physical inputs Gj made up of
a value-added bundle KLj and an aggregate of intermediate inputs EMj. KLj is composed
of inputs of labor vLj and capital services vKj. EMj comprises nested bundles of energy
intermediate goods Ej and non-energy intermediate goods Mj.
Figure 4(b) shows φ’s structure in primary industries, which contains an additional
second-level nest in which sector-specific resources vFj enter in fixed proportions with Gj.
Although inputs that are reproducible within the economy can be substituted among them-
selves, they can neither create nor substitute for resources, making the latter a limiting input
whose scarcity acts as a fundamental brake on output. However, consistent with equation
(4) these constraints can be overcome by the substitution of knowledge for the composite of
resources and reproducible inputs GFj at the top level of the production hierarchy.
Figure 4(c) shows φ’s structure in a carbon-free electric power technology, which, together
with a fossil-fuelled electric power technology, makes up the output of the electricity sector.
The former uses all of the electric sector’s inputs of “fixed-factor” energy resources, while the
latter uses all of the electric sector’s fossil fuel inputs according to the production function in
25Dynamic optimization models with general production technologies and multiple capital stocks that
exhibit different depreciation rates are analytically intractable (see, e.g. Wildasin, 1984). The multisector
production correspondence of a CGE model, with its full system of intermediate demands, makes it impossible
to analytically specify rates of return to capital and knowledge. To simplify the process of calibrating the
economy to a dynamic path numerical simulation studies often invoke the assumption that the economy
is on a balanced growth path. But the ratios of investment to asset service flows are different for capital
and knowledge in the SAM, implying that even the initial condition for the accumulation process is not
saddlepath stable. These factors conspire to obstruct the solution for an economic growth trajectory that
equalizes the rates of return to knowledge and capital across industries.
11
Figure 4(a).26 The outputs of these technologies are assumed to be perfect substitutes. The
electricity sector’s inputs of non-energy intermediate goods, labor, capital and knowledge
are split between these technologies according to their benchmark shares of net generation.
The model’s first key feature is that knowledge services are a homogeneous “super factor”
that substitute for all other commodities and factors in the economy. The degree to which
knowledge services alleviate the effects of natural resources scarcity or regulatory constraints
on fossil fuels is a function of the relative magnitudes of the sectoral coefficients on knowledge
and fossil fuels (implied by the SAM), and the top-level elasticity of substitution σH .
27
4.2 Public Provision and International Trade
The government is modelled as a passive entity that uses industries’ outputs to produce
a public good that is allocated between consumption and investment activities. Trade is
modelled equally simply.28 Domestic production of each commodity is allocated between do-
mestic and export markets through a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) technology.
The domestically-produced component of each good is combined with imports of that good
into an Armington composite commodity (Armington, 1969) according to a CES technol-
ogy. The resulting vector of Armington goods A fulfills intermediate and final commodity
demands. Export demands and import supplies are exogenously specified.
4.3 Aggregate Carbon Accounting and Emissions Limits
The model’s activities emit carbon in proportion to their demand for inputs of Armington
energy goods Ae and a vector of carbon coefficients θe shown in Table 4. Emissions ac-
counting occurs in a “weigh-station” sector through which Armington energy commodities
pass en route to intermediate and final demand. This sector possesses a fixed-coefficients
transformation technology in which aggregate energy use (production minus exports plus
imports) is regulated by Ae’s embodied carbon:
(6) Ae = ζ(Ae, θeAe),
∑
e
θeAe ≤ κ ⊥ q
The representative agent is endowed with a quantity of permits κ that restricts the economy’s
emissions to the level set by policy. When the permit endowment is small enough to be a
binding constraint on the economy’s emissions, the carbon embodied in fossil fuels has a
positive shadow price q that is the dual of κ. In the model’s taˆttonement process, initial
excess demand for permits induces substitution that distributes emissions reductions among
industries and energy commodities so as to minimize the aggregate cost of abatement. The
revenue from these purchases accrues to the representative agent as lump-sum income.
26Fixed-factor energy resources are uranium reserves in nuclear electric generation, stream flow in hy-
droelectricity, arable land area in biomass energy and high-insolation land area in solar power. In 1997
carbon-free technologies accounted for 30.3 percent of net electric generation (U.S. Dept. of Energy: Energy
Information Administration, 2000).
27The true value of σH is unknown. In the simulation it is treated as an uncertain parameter whose value
is unity by default, but can range from 0.5 to 2.0.
28Because the U.S. is a large closed economy (exports and imports sum to 23 percent of GDP in the SAM)
trade is largely inconsequential to the main point of the paper.
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4.4 Demand
The representative agent maximizes utility U by allocating vectors of commodity inputs to
the final demands consumption, investment and R&D (gd) subject to their prices (p˜
A) and
the constraint of her income (Z):
(7) max
gd
U(gd) s.t. p˜
A ·
∑
d
gd ≤ Z[w ·V, τ
A · (pAA), q · κ]
Income is the measure of welfare in the model. It is composed of factor remuneration (w ·V,
where V is the aggregate factor endowment), commodity tax revenue (τA · (pAA), where τA
net ad-valorem taxes and pA is the net-of-tax vector of prices of Armington goods), and the
revenue from carbon taxes, or symmetrically, auctioned emissions permits.
The model’s second key feature is its demand structure, which is modelled by the nested
CES function shown in Figure 4(d). It extends the consumption-savings choice of the final
demand system of Ballard et al. (1985) by adding a subsidiary nesting hierarchy that resolves
aggregate saving S into tangible (capital) and intangible (R&D) investment. The agent’s
allocation of income between the components of saving on the basis of their relative costs
implicitly defines the function ρ, and provides the mechanism for price-inducement of R&D.
The resulting aggregate investment (I) and R&D (R) determine the accumulation of physical
and intangible capital stocks. The propensity of the representative agent to invest in R&D
is a function of the coefficients on I and R (implied by the SAM) and the elasticity of
substitution σS between physical investment and R&D.
29 This and other elasticities used in
the calibration of U are given in Table 5.
4.5 The Dynamic Process of the Economy
The growth of output, energy use and emissions over time is driven by increases in the sup-
plies of labor, natural resources, physical and intangible capital. The aggregate endowments
of labor and natural resources are determined period-by-period by simple supply curves
whose price elasticities (ηL and ηF , respectively) are shown in Table 5. In each period the
resource thus supplied to each industry acts as a fixed factor, while labor is intersectorally
mobile. The accumulation of knowledge assets (i.e., $) is modelled according to the standard
perpetual inventory assumption, in a manner identical to capital. In each period, the asset
stocks are multiplied by their respective benchmark rates of return to yield the aggregate
endowments of capital and knowledge services. The inter-sectoral distributions of both these
inputs are determined by the general equilibrium solution in each period, which in the case
of intangible services implicitly defines the function ϑ.
29The true value of σS is unknown. In the simulation it is treated as an uncertain parameter whose value
is unity by default, but can range from 0.5 to 2.0.
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5 Results and Discussion
5.1 Characteristics of the Business-as-Usual (BaU) Simulation
Over the century of the BaU simulation US GDP grows more than eight times, from 11 to
92 trillion dollars, with the annual rate of growth falling from 4.3 percent to one percent
by 2100. At the same time aggregate energy demand and carbon emissions rise much more
slowly—by almost five times from 102 to 472 exajoules (EJ), and by a factor of six from 1.5
to 8 gigatons (GT), respectively.30
The economy exhibits a declining carbon-intensity that is the net effect of a rising carbon-
energy ratio and a falling energy-GDP ratio. The former effect is due to the abundance of
coal relative to oil and gas, while the latter is driven by the substitution of capital and
knowledge inputs for energy. The fact that the aggregate bias of technical change is energy-
and emissions-saving is an important result, demonstrating that modeling technical change
through the accumulation and substitution of knowledge can successfully reproduce the
observed decline in energy intensity of approximately one percent per year, without heuristic
modelling devices such as the autonomous energy efficiency improvement (AEEI).31
Nevertheless, in the absence of countervailing forces technological change does not cause
a reduction in energy use and carbon emissions. Although the substitution of increasingly
abundant inputs of capital and knowledge facilitates reduction in aggregate energy intensity,
the expanding endowments of these factors simultaneously make possible a greater-than-
proportionate increase of aggregate output, with the result that energy use and emissions
rise in absolute terms. Thus, the most effective means of reducing emissions is not to generate
new knowledge by increasing R&D, but rather to directly impose limits on the use of fossil
fuels.
The capital-output ratio and knowledge-output ratio both rise over the simulation, with
knowledge accumulating relative to capital because of the former asset’s zero depreciation
rate. Even in the absence of policy, the process of accumulation causes relative prices to
change, inducing follow-on changes in R&D. However, the magnitude of such changes is
limited by the ability of the economy to make use of the expanded endowments that result
from accumulation. Figure 5(a) gives an indication of the importance of knowledge in this
process, wherein increases in its substitutability in production (larger values of σH) result in
significantly faster growth of emissions, by as much as 1.8 gigatons in 2100. The sensitivity of
emissions to elements of the model that represent ϑ and φ shows that the shift in production
possibilities as a result of knowledge substitution positively affects output. This effect is
even more apparent in the presence of the large relative price movements that result from a
tax carbon emissions, to which I now turn.
30Over the medium term the model’s results exceed official forecasts of GDP, energy use and emissions.
In U.S. Dept. of Energy: Energy Information Administration’s (2001) reference projection for the year 2020,
the economy produces 17 trillion dollars worth of goods and services, uses 131 exajoules of energy and emits
2088 megatons (MT) of carbon. The corresponding figures for the BaU simulation are 23 trillion dollars,
172 EJ and 2754 MT.
31The first documented use of the AEEI is Edmonds and Reilly (1985), who cite the historical decline in the
energy intensity of GDP with increasing economic development as justification for a declining coefficient on
energy input. They create a simulation model with a level of energy-saving technology whose inverse is used
to attenuate price-determined demands for fuels. This trick is still applied in state-of-the-art intertemporal
CGE models for climate policy analysis (e.g. Bernstein et al., 1999).
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5.2 Aggregate Effects of a Carbon Tax in the Presence of ITC
To elucidate the macroeconomic impact of ITC I impose a tax (qt) of 100 dollars per ton of
carbon from the year 2010 onward, and allow the simulation to solve myopically for the cost-
minimizing dual emission rate in each period (κt). The aggregate impacts of this policy are
shown in Figure 5. Figure 5(a) shows that the constant tax generates significant abatement,
it only negligibly reduces the slope of the emissions profile over the period 2000-2100. Figure
5(b) shows that the tax incurs an immediate welfare loss of about 0.7 percent of national
income, which grows in the near term but quickly saturates to a long-run value of between
1.2 and 1.5 percent. Figure 5(c) shows that the carbon tax reduces R&D, implying that
in the aggregate innovation is more sensitive to output than to prices, consistent with prior
firm- and industry-level studies. The result is that accumulation and the economy’s long-run
stock of knowledge decline, as shown in Figure 5(d).
Insight into the effects of ITC can be gleaned from the responses of the aggregate variables
in Figure 5 to changes in the elasticities of knowledge creation (σS) and substitution (σH).
The time series of R&D and knowledge in Figures 5(c) and 5(d) are strongly affected by
σS. The larger the value of this parameter, the more sensitive the balance of investment to
the relative prices of I and R, and the more pre-existing taxes on R&D are able to tip this
balance against intangibles. Thus, smaller penalties to R&D and knowledge accumulation
occur when σS is at its lowest value. But these charts show that R and H are also affected
by σH . The larger the value of this parameter, the more elastic the economy’s response to
the tax, and the smaller the reduction in both income and the resources for investment.
Paradoxically however, if the policy shock causes large reductions in R&D, a high value
of σH makes producers more vulnerable to the consequent decline in inputs of knowledge.
Thus, output, research and knowledge suffer the smallest penalty when σH is at its highest
value and σS is at its lowest value. The consequence of interactions of these accumulation
and substitution effects is that over the range of variation in σS and σH , the welfare losses
in Figure 5(b) can change by as much as four percent of their mean value in each period.
These results appear to confirm findings by Goulder and Schneider and Nordhaus that
the effect of ITC is small. The influence of σH on the time series in Figure 5 indicates that
the substitution effect is important, but its welfare implications are not obvious. For clearer
insight into the effects of substitution and reallocation of knowledge we must scrutinize the
behavior of the economy at the sectoral level.
5.3 Industry-Level Impacts and the Effects of ITC
The cumulative effects of an emissions tax at the industry level can be seen in Figure 6.
Figure 6(a) shows that carbon taxes yield abatement of cumulative emissions of 10-15 per-
cent in most industries through reductions in fossil-fuel use. However, much more abatement
occurs in oil and gas mining, fossil fuel supply and electricity industries due to the additional
effects of reduced output and own-sector purchases. Thus, while most industries experience
reductions in cumulative output of less than five percent, the fossil-fuel and electricity sup-
ply sectors, especially the carbon-intensive coal industry, suffer precipitous declines (Figure
6(b)).
Industries’ changes in cumulative R&D tend to mirror their reductions in output, but the
decline in R&D exceeds the fall in output in the more carbon-intensive coal and electricity
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sectors and falls short of that in the less carbon-intensive mining and natural gas sectors
(Figure 6(c)). In fact, the R&D-output ratio increases slightly across a broad range of
industries, including the key construction, machinery and transportation sectors that make
up the bulk of aggregate R&D (Figure 6(d)). This result indicates that R&D is being induced,
but that prices’ indirect negative influence through the reduction in output outweighs their
direct positive influence on ρ. Still, the net of these influences produces the positive outcome
that both R&D and knowledge services decline by a smaller amount than income at the
macro-level.
Industry-level changes in the quantity of knowledge inputs highlight the influence of the
substitution effect. Figure 6(e) shows that inputs of knowledge to fall sharply in primary
fossil fuel supply sectors and decline slightly in non-energy industries, but rise in the elec-
tricity sector. The reason is that electric power can be produced using the carbon-free
technology, mitigating excess demand for energy without increasing emissions. Thus, in
the constrained solution there is reallocation of knowledge to this technology, causing its
share of cumulative electric output to expand to 40 percent, from 24 percent in the BaU.
Additionally, in Figure 6(f) there is more intensive utilization of knowledge by non-energy
sectors that under BaU conditions, indicating that knowledge is substituting for physical
inputs. Knowledge is therefore reallocated away from output-constrained fossil-fuel sectors
toward input-constrained sectors where its marginal product is greater due to its ability to
substitute for limited energy inputs.
5.4 Accumulation, Substitution and Welfare
In light of the substantial inter-sectoral movements of knowledge that occur within the model,
it is natural to ask how much of the aggregate welfare change is due to accumulation and
how much is due to substitution. To address this question it is useful to think of the change
in cumulative income (∆Z∗) as the sum of three influences: the adverse effect of carbon
taxes in the absence of ITC (∆Z∗No ITC), the effect of knowledge accumulation (∆Z
∗
Accum)
at the aggregate level and the reallocation of knowledge at the sectoral level (∆Z∗Alloc). To
examine the relative importance of these factors I perform two sets of runs of the model,
one in which there is no induced change in knowledge accumulation, and another in which
accumulation is turned off and the substitution effect is minimized. In the former, aggregate
R&D is constrained to match its BaU trajectory, yielding welfare losses that are equivalent
to ∆Z∗No Accum = ∆Z
∗
No ITC + ∆Z
∗
Alloc. In the latter R&D is fixed as before, and in the
presence of carbon taxes σH is set to its lowest computationally-feasible value (σH = 0.5,
irrespective of its value in the BaU scenario), yielding welfare losses that are equivalent
to ∆Z∗No ITC. These simulations permit the components of ITC to be isolated as follows:
∆Z∗Accum = ∆Z
∗ −∆Z∗No Accum, and ∆Z
∗
Alloc = ∆Z
∗
No Accum −∆Z
∗
No ITC.
The results, shown in Figure 7, illustrate the important role of the knowledge substitu-
tion and reallocation in determining the welfare impact of ITC. Figure 7(a) shows that in
the absence of ITC the carbon tax inflicts large reductions in welfare, over 80 percent of
which are mitigated by the substitution effect, and which are also slightly exacerbated by the
accumulation effect. Decomposing this result into the changes in cumulative income in the
first and second 50-year periods of the simulation horizon, Figure 7(b) shows that during the
first 50 years the negative effects of the tax are small, but still outweigh the positive effects
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of the substitution effect. During this initial period the stock of knowledge has not had time
to accumulate, leading to relatively small endowments of malleable knowledge services that
do not facilitate sufficient reallocation to mitigate the deadweight loss of the carbon tax.
However, during the later 50 years the tax inflicts much larger deadweight losses, that are
balanced by greatly enhanced substitution (Figure 7(c)). This occurs because the onset of
stringent abatement (and large shifts in relative prices) coincides with the accumulation of
knowledge relative to the early part of the simulation, yielding much larger endowments of
intangible services that facilitate more knowledge substitution.
5.5 The Welfare Impacts of R&D Taxes and Subsidies
The final issue that I tackle is the effect of distortions in the market for R&D. Thus far, all of
the results reflect the presence of taxes on the components of R&D in the model (τR = 0.03),
which remain at their benchmark levels throughout the simulations. Goulder and Schneider’s
finding that ITC’s ability to mitigate the cost of a carbon tax is enhanced by phasing out
taxes on R&D or instituting modest R&D subsidies raises the question of the welfare impact
of such measures in the present setting, where there are no external benefits to R&D.32 To
address this question I perform additional simulations in which pre-existing R&D taxes are
first phased out (τR = 0) and then replaced by subsidies in which the flow of carbon tax
revenue in each period is recycled to R&D (τR < 0).
The results, shown in Figure 8, while generally confirming Goulder and Schneider’s find-
ings, provide fresh insight into the mechanisms through which they arise. Figures 8(a) and
8(b) show that R&D subsidies lower the cost of performing research, causing both the total
quantity of R&D and the rate of knowledge accumulation to increase. These act to re-
verse the sign of the accumulation effect’s contribution to aggregate welfare, enabling it to
compensate for carbon tax-induced deadweight losses, as shown in Figure 8(c).
Figure 8(d) shows that the tax revenue streams and their corresponding rates of subsidy
are so large that cutting emissions creates a substantial net welfare gain. This result, which
seems implausible, is an artifact of the model’s myopic saving rule.33 But notwithstanding
this caveat, the uniformly positive effect of reducing τR emphasizes that the real justification
for subsidizing R&D is not the external benefits of research. On the contrary, the rationale
for an R&D subsidy is simple and fundamental: to mitigate the effects on research of the fall
in output, and thereby sustain the rate of accumulation of a factor whose substitutability
lowers the aggregate cost of abatement.34 Spillovers, by dint of the fact that they multiplica-
32This result is an example of the “double dividend” of environmental taxation, the revenue from which
is ordinarily recycled to consumers as lump-sum income, but whose diversion to other more productive uses
may be welfare-improving. An early survey on the double dividend hypothesis is Goulder (1995), more up-
to-date analyses in an environmental context are reviewed by Bovenberg and Goulder (2001). Much of this
literature focuses on the use of carbon tax revenue to reduce factor taxes, but the issue here is the long-run
effect of channelling it into subsidies for R&D.
33Over the period 2010-2100 the revenue generated by carbon taxes results in an R&D subsidy that varies
between 12 and 17 percent. An intertemporally optimizing agent, sensitive to the effect of current R&D
on future abatement costs, would likely allocate a greater portion of her income (and therefore recycled tax
revenue) to research, without requiring the additional stimulus of an R&D subsidy.
34Goulder and Schneider (pp. 238-239) recognize this fundamental principle: “In sum, whenever parame-
ters are changed to make stocks of knowledge more important as a productive input, cheaper to acquire, or
more easily substitutable with other factors, the GDP costs of attaining a given carbon tax rise and the costs
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tively augment each unit of R&D, accentuate the benefit of the subsidy, but are nonetheless
ancillary to the main effect of accumulation itself.
6 Conclusion
I conclude by returning to the big picture in Figure 1. The results of the paper elucidate both
the mechanisms that drive the feedback loop (II)-(III) and the way in which they are affected
by distortions in the market for R&D. The accumulation of knowledge responds negatively
to the income effects of a tax on carbon emissions, slightly exacerbating its deadweight loss,
while the substitution of knowledge in production responds positively to the relative price
effects of the tax, strongly mitigating its deadweight loss. Removing pre-existing taxes on
R&D or recycling carbon tax revenues to R&D subsidies reverses the sign of the carbon tax’s
effect on R&D, augmenting accumulation. However, altering the substitutability of physical
and intangible investment or the substitutability of knowledge in production only slightly
affect the cumulative aggregate welfare losses of a carbon tax.
The implications of these findings for the design of GHG abatement policies are unclear.
Whether to make cuts in emissions now or postpone them to future periods is an intertem-
poral optimization problem that the present recursive-dynamic model is not designed to
solve. Nonetheless, the results raise the possibility that a policy of vigorous abatement
in the near-term, by generating substantial additional tax revenue that can be recycled to
R&D subsidies, can hasten knowledge accumulation over the entire simulation, resulting in
an increase in the endowments of knowledge available for substitution. By contrast, a “wait-
and-see” policy only allows recycling of tax or auctioned permit revenue toward the end of
the policy horizon, with less of a head-start for rapid accumulation and (perhaps) smaller
endowments of knowledge. The critical question is what difference the timing of recycled
tax revenues makes for cumulative welfare losses of under the two policy approaches. When
abatement is imposed and its associated distortions and tax revenue streams are taken as
given, the welfare impact of R&D subsidies depends on the balance between their positive
effect on output and the opportunity cost of the revenue itself. Given the preeminent role
of knowledge demonstrated here, the relevant tradeoff is between the cumulative discounted
benefits of investing the revenue in R&D versus consuming it outright. This is an important
issue that deserves further scrutiny.
Abstracting from the specifics of climate change mitigation, these findings indicate that
induced technical change plays an important mitigating role in the adjustment of the econ-
omy to large-scale policy constraints, but not in the way traditionally thought. Implicit in
many descriptions of the process of induced innovation is that constraints somehow induce
more research, faster intangible accumulation, and substitution of knowledge for polluting in-
puts to production. The results of the paper argue that this picture is not generally accurate.
Accumulation depends less on the mechanism of price-inducement that on the income effects
of the policy, whereas the substitutability of knowledge itself—both for constrained inputs
and among production activities—is the most important channel through which induced
innovation lowers the costs of adjustment.
of reaching a given abatement target fall.” However, their association of ITC with R&D spillovers clouds its
deeper implications for their results.
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This point impinges not only on the way in which ITC is represented in simulation
models for policy evaluation and optimization, but also on the way in which the aggregate
behavior of knowledge and the impact of its accumulation are modeled more generally. The
treatment of knowledge as industry-specific in character reflects its tacitness. By contrast,
the treatment of knowledge as both highly fungible for physical inputs and mobile among
producers reflects its general-purpose or analogical character. At the aggregate level, which
of these formulations best captures the true behavior of knowledge is an open question with
implications that stretch far beyond the present environmental policy focus.
The tension between these views lies in their differing predictions of the allocation of
knowledge in response to relative price changes, which is the crux of the induced innovation
hypothesis. If knowledge is resistant to codification or transmission outside of the context
of its genesis, or is embodied in tangible factors whose short-run supply is limited, then its
allocation will be governed by the price system in a manner that is identical to other tangible
commodities. Alternatively, if knowledge can be costlessly re-used in different contexts, or
combined in different ways so as to be useful in entirely new contexts, then it will not
behave according to conventional conceptions of scarcity, and will require something other
than price changes to stimulate its movement among producers. The central question raised
by this paper, then, is where within these extrema is the allocative mechanism that governs
the economy’s inventive response to policy shocks. This is an important topic for future
research.
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Table 1: Papers on Inducement of Technical Change by Environmental Constraints
Jaffe and Palmer (1997)
∂ log ρi
∂ log pD
≈ 0
Newell et al. (1999); Popp (2002b)
∂ log $e
∂ log Re
×
∂ log ρe
∂ log pe
> 0
Newell et al. (1999)
∂ log ρ
∂ log pe
≈ 0
Popp (2001)
∂ log pD
∂ log vD
×
∂ log ϑ
∂ log He
< 0
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Table 2: Industries in the SAM
1. Agriculture Aircraft & parts
Livestock & livestock prod. Other transportation equip.
Other agricultural prod. 16. Transportation
Forestry & fishery prod. Rail & rel. serv., passenger ground transp.
2. Mining Motor freight transport & warehousing
Metallic ores mining Water transportation
Nonmetallic minerals mining Air transportation
3. Crude petroleum & natural gas Pipelines, freight forwarders, & rel. serv.
4. Construction 17. Manufacturing
New construction Ordnance & accessories
Maintenance & repair construction Food & kindred prod.
5. Coal mining Tobacco prod.
6. Petroleum refining & related prod. Broad & narrow fabrics, yarn & thread mills
7. Gas prod. & distrib. (utilities) Misc. textile goods & floor coverings
8. Electric serv. (utilities) Apparel
9. Paper & allied prod., ex. containers Misc. fabricated textile prod.
10. Chemicals Lumber & wood prod.
Industrial & other chemicals Furniture & fixtures
Agricultural fertilizers & chemicals Paperboard containers & boxes
Plastics & synthetic materials Newspapers & periodicals
Cleaning & toilet preparations Other printing & publishing
Paints & allied prod. Pharmaceuticals
Rubber & misc. plastics prod. Footwear, leather, & leather prod.
11. Stone, Clay and Glass Misc. manufacturing
Glass & glass prod. 18. Services
Stone & clay prod. Agricultural, forestry, & fishery serv.
12. Metals Communications, ex. radio & TV
Primary iron & steel mfg. Radio & TV broadcasting
Primary nonferrous metals mfg. Water & sanitary serv.
Metal containers Wholesale trade
Heating, plumbing, & fab. struct. metal prod. Retail trade
Screw machine prod. & stampings Finance
Other fabricated metal prod. Insurance
13. Machinery Real estate & royalties
Engines & turbines Hotels & lodging places
Farm, construction, & mining machinery Personal & repair serv. (ex. auto)
Materials handling machinery & equip. Other business & prof. serv., ex. medical
Metalworking machinery & equip. Advertising
Special industry machinery & equip. Eating & drinking places
General industrial machinery & equip. Automotive repair & service
Misc. machinery, ex. electrical Amusements
14. Equipment Health services
Service industry machinery Federal gov’t. indus.; State & local gov’t. indus
Electrical industrial equip. & apparatus General gov’t. industry; Household industry
Household appliances 19. Owner-occupied dwellings
Electric lighting & wiring equip. Knowledge-intensive industries
Audio, video, & communication equip. Computer & office equip.
Misc. electrical machinery & supplies Electronic components & accessories
Ophthalmic & photographic equip. Scientific & controlling instruments
15. Transportation Equipment Comp. & data proc. serv., incl. own-acct. serv.
Motor vehicles (passenger cars & trucks) Legal, engineering, accounting, & related serv.
Truck & bus bodies, trailers, & vehic. parts Educ. & social serv., & membership orgs.
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Table 3: Investment In and Returns to Knowledge in the SAM
Input-output estimates giR
a vHj
a vHj/gjR
b giR/Y ib vHj/Y jb
∑
e xej/Y jb
Agriculture 2.1 4.6 218 0.6 1.3 2.6
Mining 0.1 1.7 1180 0.4 4.9 8.5
Oil & gas 0.0 7.5 – 0.0 5.5 5.9
Construction 23.6 211.6 898 1.9 16.8 1.3
Coal 0.5 1.9 408 1.6 6.7 14.3
Petroleum refining 2.6 7.1 273 1.3 3.4 11.4
Natural gas distrib. 1.8 10.6 581 1.4 7.9 20.7
Electric utilities 11.2 22.5 202 3.8 7.8 9.0
Paper products 7.2 3.6 50 5.3 2.6 3.6
Chemicals 21.5 38.5 179 3.7 6.7 3.3
Stone clay & glass 4.5 3.1 69 4.4 3.0 4.7
Metals 40.2 17.2 43 8.3 3.5 3.0
Manufacturing 1.2 9.6 771 0.5 3.8 1.1
Machinery 22.2 137.8 622 4.7 29.4 0.9
Equipment 1.0 102.7 10253 0.2 15.9 0.7
Transportation equip. 16.7 60.1 361 2.6 9.5 4.7
Transportation 33.9 42.3 125 2.4 3.0 1.3
Services 369.7 789.9 214 4.1 8.7 1.2
Dwellings 0.0 9.7 – 0.0 1.3 0.0
Distortions in R&D τR
a τR/τ
b
Taxes 17.6 – – 2.8 –
aBillion 1997 dollars
bPercent
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Table 4: US Carbon Emissions and Energy Use, 2000a
Carbon Primary Output Carbon Energy Carbon
Emissionsb Energy + Imports Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Demandc - Exportsd on Energy on Output on Output
(θCe )
e (θEe )
f (θe = θ
C
e θ
E
e )
g
Coal 566.3 23.4 23.7 24.2 0.99 23.9
Petroleum 646.3 40.2 233.7 16.1 0.19 3.0
Natural Gas 322.7 23.8 133.6 13.6 0.18 2.4
Electricity – 15.6 292.3 – 0.05 –
Nuclear – 8.4 – – – –
Renewables – 6.8 – – – –
Total 1535.3 118.2 633.1 – – –
aEmissions are attributed to the sectors whose products are combusted, as opposed to those that transform
natural resources into fuels. Carbon released to the atmosphere from fossil fuel mining operations is assumed
to be negligible.
bMegatons
cExajoules
dBillion 1997 dollars
eGigatons per exajoule
fExajoules per billion dollars
gGigatons per billion dollars
Source: U.S. Dept. of Energy: Energy Information Administration (2000) and author’s cal-
culations.
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Table 5: Supply and Substitution Elasticities
σKL σE σA ηF σKL σE σA
Agriculture 0.68 1.45 2.31 0.5 Stone, clay & glass 0.94 1.08 2.74
Mining 0.68 1.45 2.31 1.0 Metals 0.91 1.21 2.74
Oil & gas 0.68 1.45 5.00 1.0 Machinery 0.91 1.21 2.74
Construction 0.95 1.04 1.00 – Equipment 0.91 1.21 2.74
Coal 0.8 1.08 1.14 2.0 Transportation Equip. 0.8 1.04 1.14
Petroleum 0.74 1.04 2.21 – Transportation 0.8 1.04 1.00
Natural gas 0.96 1.04 1.00 – Misc. manufacturing 0.94 1.08 2.74
Electricity 0.81 0.97 1.00 0.5 Services 0.8 1.81 1.00
Paper 0.94 1.08 2.74 – Dwellings 0.98 1.07 –
Chemicals 0.94 1.08 2.74 –
σHj = 1.0, σQj = 0.7, σFj = 0, σEMj = 0.7, σMj = 0.6, σTj = 1.0, σAj = 1.0 ∀j
σC = 1.0, σI = 1.0, σR = 1.0, σG = 1.0, σS = 1.0
ηL = 2.0
Source: Bovenberg and Goulder (1996), Goulder and Schneider (1999), Dahl and Duggan
(1996) and author’s assumptions. See Sue Wing (2001).
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Figure 1: Global Warming and Induced Technical Change
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(a) A SAM with embodied knowledge
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(b) Concentration of knowledge in a particular industry
Figure 2: Embodiment of Knowledge Within the SAM
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(a) Aggregation of knowledge-intensive industries
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(b) The SAM with explicit knowledge accounting
Figure 3: Accounting for Knowledge Within the SAM
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(a) Manufacturing, Services and
Carbon-Based Electricity
(b) Natural Resource, Mining and
Agriculture Sectors
(c) Carbon-Free Electricity (d) Demand
Figure 4: Technologies of Production and Demanda
aDiagonal connectors represent the relationship between output and the inputs of nested production
functions that exhibit positive elasticities of substitution (σ > 0). Horizontal and vertical connectors (e.g.
in (b) and (c)) represent the relationship between output and the inputs in a fixed coefficient (Leontief)
production function in which there is no substitution (σ = 0).
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(a) Carbon Emissions (gigatons) (b) Change in Z from BaU (percent)
(c) Change in R from BaU (percent) (d) Change in H from BaU (percent)
Figure 5: Aggregate Impacts of a Carbon Tax
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(a) Cumulative Emissions (b) Cumulative Output
(c) Cumulative R&D (d) R&D-Output Ratio
(e) Cumulative Knowledge Input (f) Knowledge-Output Ratio
Figure 6: Industry Impacts of a Carbon Taxa
aPercent change from BaU scenario. Industries are numbered as in Table 2. Impacts shown are for the
base case of σS = σH = 1. The patterns of effects are similar in simulations that use other values of these
elasticities.
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Percent Change from BaU Scenario:  No ITC  Accumulation Substitution
(a) Change in Cumulative Income
(b) Change in Cumulative Income, 2000-2050
(c) Change in Cumulative Income, 2050-2100
Figure 7: Decomposition of ITC’s Welfare Impact
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(a) Cumulative R&D (b) Cumulative Knowledge Input
(c) Cumulative Income due to Accumulation (d) Cumulative Income
Figure 8: Impacts of R&D Taxes and Subsidies on Accumulation and Welfarea
aPercent change from BaU scenario. Impacts shown are for the base case of σS = σH = 1. The patterns
of effects are similar in simulations that use other values of these elasticities.
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Appendix: The Structure of the Numerical Model
A.1 Nomenclature
Subscripts:
i, j the set of goods or industries
mfg (⊂ j) the set of manufacturing industries
svc (⊂ j) the set of service industries
res (⊂ j) the set of natural resource industries (agriculture and mining)
cel (⊂ j) carbon-based electric power
ncel (⊂ j) carbon-free electric power
e (⊂ i) the set of energy intermediate goods
m (⊂ i) the set of non-energy intermediate goods
f the set of primary factors (labor, capital, knowledge)
Superscripts:
D domestic
W world
A Armington domestic-import composite
Elasticities of substitution:
σHj between knowledge and physical inputs in sector j
σKLj between capital and labor in sector j
σEMj between intermediate energy and non-energy goods in sector j
σEj among intermediate energy goods in sector j
σMj among intermediate non-energy goods in sector j
σAi (Armington) between imported and domestically-produced varieties of good i
σT i (transformation) between domestically-produced and exported varieties of good i
σU between consumption and saving (unity)
σS between investment and R&D
σC among sectoral inputs to consumption
σI among sectoral inputs to investment
σR among sectoral inputs to R&D
Supply Elasticities:
ηL aggregate labor supply
ηFj natural resources in sector j
Prices:
wH price of knowledge services
wK price of capital services
wL wage
wFj price of natural resource in sector j
pi producer price in sector i
pDi domestic price of good i
pWi world price of good i
pAi net-of-tax Armington price of good i
p˜Ai gross-of-tax Armington price of good i
pQFj price of intermediate-primary factor-natural resource composite in sector j
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pQj price of intermediate-primary factor composite in sector j
pKLj price of capital-labor composite in sector j
pEMj price of energy-material composite in sector j
pEj price of energy composite in sector j
pMj price of material composite in sector j
pU price of utility
pC price of aggregate consumption
pS price of aggregate savings
pI price of aggregate investment
pR price of aggregate R&D
Taxes:
τAi net tax rate on supply Armington good i
τR net tax rate on aggregate R&D
q tax rate on carbon
Share Parameters:
aHj knowledge share of output in sector j
aRj resource share of intermediate-primary factor-natural resource composite in sector j
aKLj capital-labor share of intermediate-primary factor composite in sector j
aEMj energy-materials share of intermediate-primary factor composite in sector j
aKj capital share of capital-labor composite in sector j
aEj energy share of energy-materials composite in sector j
aej share of energy good e in energy composite in sector j
amj share of non-energy good m in materials composite in sector j
aDTi domestic market share of output in sector i
aDAi domestic market share of Armington domestic-import composite i
Activity Levels:
Yj production in sector j
giX export supply of good i
giM import demand for good i
Ai supply of Armington good i
Di supply of domestic good i
xij demand for intermediate good i in sector j
vLj demand for labor in sector j
vKj demand for capital services in sector j
vHj demand for knowledge services in sector j
vFj demand for natural resources in sector j
C aggregate consumption
I aggregate investment
R aggregate research and development
S aggregate saving
Z aggregate income of the representative agent
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A.2 General Equilibrium in a Complementarity Format35
In Arrow-Debreu equilibrium industries make zero profits, excess demand is zero in all mar-
kets, and the expenditure of the representative agent exhausts the value of her endowments.
The expression of general equilibrium in a complementarity format consists of associating
each zero profit condition with a dual activity level and each market clearance condition
with a dual price level.36
The price of each sector’s output is determined by its unit cost function (A-1) that is
the dual of φj. The representative agent equates the value of each unit of consumption,
investment or R&D to the value of utility in accordance with her expenditure function (A-2)
that is the dual of U . The marginal utility of income pU is the nume´raire price in the model
(A-3). Zero profit in the export transformation and import aggregation sectors imply the
dual unit cost functions (A-4) and (A-5), respectively. The dual of ζ is the gross-of-carbon-
tax price on each energy good (A-6a), which is a linear combination of its Armington price,
its carbon intensity and the price of emission permits.
Each sector’s activity level represents its supply, which in equilibrium is balanced by
the sum of the demands for its output.37 The demands for commodity imports (A-7) and
exports (A-8) are exogenous, and pin down the levels of activity in domestic and Armington
composite sectors. These supplies balance the demands for exports (A-9) and Armington
commodities (A-10), respectively. The latter is determined by the agent’s use of these goods
for the purposes of consumption, investment and R&D, as well as industries’ activity levels,
which determine the demands for intermediate goods (A-11). The sectoral components of
aggregate demand for primary factors (A-12)-(A-15) exhaust the endowments of the repre-
sentative agent in each period. The revenue from factor rentals, auctioned emission permits
(A-16) and Armington commodity taxes (A-6) and taxes on R&D make up the agent’s in-
come (A-17), out of which the demands for consumption (A-18) and saving (A-19)—and their
constituents, investment (A-20), R&D (A-21) and public provision (A-22)—are financed.
The MPSGE software package (Rutherford, 1995; Rutherford, 1999) is used to calibrate
the technical coefficients (a) in equations (A-1)-(A-22) based on the SAM constructed in
Section 3 and the parameters in Tables 4 and 5. The result is a square system of nonlinear
equations that is formulated as a mixed complementarity problem and numerically solved
by the PATH solver (Dirkse and Ferris, 1995) for GAMS (Brooke et al., 1998) to yield the
equilibrium vectors of prices and activity levels in each period.
Zero Profit Conditions (activity levels):
Unit production cost (Yj):
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(A-1a) pj =


[
aHj w
1−σHj
H + (1− aHj) p
1−σHj
Qj
] 1
1−σHj j ∈ 〈mfg, svc, cel〉[
aHj w
1−σHj
H + (1− aHj) p
1−σHj
QFj
] 1
1−σHj j ∈ 〈res, ncel〉
Intermediate-primary factor-natural resource composite:
35In this section the time subscripts on prices and activity levels are suppressed for ease of exposition.
36For excellent expositions, see Mathiesen (1985) and Bo¨hringer (1998).
37By Shephard’s Lemma, these are the derivatives of the unit cost functions of the activities that use the
output of that particular sector as an input.
38Depending on the value of σH this is either a Cobb-Douglas or CES cost function.
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(A-1b) pQFj = aFjwFj + (1− aFj)pQj j ∈ 〈res, ncel〉
Intermediate-primary factor composite:
(A-1c) pQj =


[
aKLj p
1−σQj
KLj + (1− aKLj) p
1−σQj
Mj
] 1
1−σQj j = ncel[
aKLj p
1−σQj
KLj + aEMj p
1−σQj
EMj
] 1
1−σQj otherwise
Sectoral capital-labor composite:
(A-1d) pKLj =
[
aKj w
1−σKLj
K + (1− aKj) w
1−σKLj
L
] 1
1−σKLj
Sectoral energy-materials composite:
(A-1e) pEMj =
[
aEj p
1−σEMj
Ej + (1− aEj) p
1−σEMj
Mj
] 1
1−σEMj
Sectoral energy composite:
(A-1f) pEj =
[∑
e
aej (p˜
A
e )
1−σEj
] 1
1−σEj
Sectoral materials composite:
(A-1g) pMj =
[∑
m
amj (p˜
A
m)
1−σMj
] 1
1−σMj
Unit expenditure function (Z):
(A-2a) pU =
(
pC
aC
)aC ( pS
1− aC
)1−aC
Aggregate saving (S):
(A-2b) pS =
[
aI p
1−σS
I + (1− aI) ((1− τR)pR)
1−σS
] 1
1−σS
Aggregate consumption (C):
(A-2c) pC =
∏
i
(
p˜Ai
aiC
)aiC
×
(
pG
aGC
)aGC
Aggregate investment (I):
(A-2d) pI =
∏
i
(
p˜Ai
aiI
)aiI
×
(
pG
aGI
)aGI
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Aggregate R&D (R):
(A-2e) pR =
∏
i
(
p˜Ai
aiR
)aiR
Aggregate public provision (G):
(A-2f) pG =
∏
i
(
p˜Ai
aiG
)aiG
Numeraire:
(A-3) pU = 1
Constant elasticity of transformation domestic-export composite (Di):
(A-4) pi =
[
aDTip
D
i
1−σTi
+ (1− aDTi)p
W
i
1−σTi
] 1
1−σTi
Armington domestic-import composite (Ai):
(A-5) pAi =
[
aDAip
D
i
1−σAi
+ (1− aDAi)p
W
i
1−σAi
] 1
1−σAi
Definition of gross-of-tax Armington composite price:
(A-6a) p˜Ae = (1 + τ
A
e )p
A
e + q/θe
(A-6b) p˜Am = (1 + τ
A
m)p
A
m
Market Clearance Conditions (prices):
Import market (pWi ):
(A-7) (1− aDi )Ai
(
pAi
pWi
)σAi
= giM
Export market (pi):
(A-8) (1− aDTi)Yi
(
pi
pWi
)σTi
= giX
Domestic market (pDi ):
(A-9) aDTi Yi
(
pi
pDi
)σTi
= aDAi Ai
(
pAi
pDi
)σAi
Armington domestic-import composite market (pAi ):
(A-10) Ai = aiC C
(
pC
p˜Ai
)σC
+ aiI I
(
pI
p˜Ai
)σI
+ aiR R
(
pR
p˜Ai
)σR
+
∑
j
xij
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Definition of Intermediate use of Armington goods:
(A-11a)
xej =


[
aej aEj aEMj (1− aHj) Yj p
σHj
j p
(σQj−σHj)
Qj p
(σEMj−σQj)
EMj ×
p
(σEj−σEMj)
E (p˜
A
e )
−σEj
] j ∈ 〈mfg, svc, cel〉
[
aej aEj aEMj (1− aFj) (1− aHj) Yj p
σHj
j p
(σQj−σHj)
Qj ×
p
(σEMj−σQj)
EMj p
(σEj−σEMj)
E (p˜
A
e )
−σEj
] j ∈ 〈res〉
(A-11b)
xmj =


[
amj aMj aEMj (1− aHj) Yj p
σHj
j p
(σQj−σHj)
Qj p
(σEMj−σQj)
EMj ×
p
(σMj−σEMj)
M (p˜
A
m)
−σMj
] j ∈ 〈mfg, svc, cel〉
[
amj aMj aEMj (1− aFj) (1− aHj) Yj p
σHj
j p
(σQj−σHj)
Qj ×
p
(σEMj−σQj)
EMj p
(σMj−σEMj)
M (p˜
A
m)
−σMj
] j ∈ 〈res〉
Labor market (wL):
(A-12)
vLj =


(1− aKj) aKLj (1− aHj) Yj p
σHj
j p
(σQj−σHj)
Qj p
(σKLj−σQj)
KLj w
−σKLj
L j ∈ 〈mfg, svc, cel〉
(1− aKj) aKLj (1− aFj) (1− aHj) Yj×(
pj
pQFj
)σHj
p
(σQj−σHj)
Qj p
(σKLj−σQj)
KLj w
−σKLj
L
j ∈ 〈res, ncel〉
Capital input market (wK):
(A-13) vKj =


aKj aKLj (1− aHj) Yj p
σHj
j p
(σQj−σHj)
Qj p
(σKLj−σQj)
KLj w
−σKLj
K j ∈ 〈mfg, svc, cel〉
aKj aKLj (1− aFj) (1− aHj) Yj×(
pj
pQFj
)σHj
p
(σQj−σHj)
Qj p
(σKLj−σQj)
KLj w
−σKLj
K
j ∈ 〈res, ncel〉
Knowledge input market (wH):
(A-14) vHj = aHj Yj
(
pj
wH
)σHj
Resource input market (wFj):
(A-15) vFj = aFj (1− aHj) Yj
(
pj
pQFj
)σHj
Aggregate emissions constraint (q):
(A-16) κ ≥
∑
e
θeAe
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Income of the representative agent (pU):
(A-17) Z = wL
∑
j
vLj + wK
∑
j
vKj + wH
∑
j
vHj +
∑
j
wFjvFj +
∑
j
τAj p
A
j Aj + τRpRR + qκ
Consumption good market (pC):
(A-18) C = aCZ
(
pU
pC
)
Savings good market (pS):
(A-19) S = (1− aC)Z
(
pU
pS
)
Investment good market (pI):
(A-20) I = aIS
(
pS
pI
)σS
R&D good market (pR):
(A-21) R = (1− aI)S
(
pS
pR
)σS
Public provision market (pG):
(A-22) G = aGCC
(
pC
pG
)
+ aGIC
(
pI
pG
)
A.3 The Dynamic Process of the Economy
The static equilibrium model is embedded within a dynamic process that is responsible for
updating both the endowments of labor, natural resources, physical and intangible capital,
and the import supply and export demand. Labor and natural resource endowments are
determined by the iso-elastic supply curves (A-23) and (A-24), respectively. Capital and
knowledge assets accumulate according to standard perpetual inventory equations (A-25)
and (A-26), respectively, and are multiplied by their respective benchmark rates of return
to determine the each period’s endowments of capital and knowledge services, (A-27) and
(A-28). Finally, the supply of imports and the demand for exports in each industry are
constrained by equations (A-29) and (A-30) to be the same proportions of Armington supply
throughout the simulation as in the SAM.
Quasi-variable factor supplies:
(A-23)
∑
j
vLjt = V L (pLt)
ηL
(A-24) vFjt = vFj (wFjt)
ηFj j ∈ res
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Stock accumulation:
(A-25) Kt+1 = It + (1− δK)Kt
(A-26) Ht+1 = Rt + (1− δH)Ht
Service flows:
(A-27)
∑
j
vKjt = (rK + δK)Kt
(A-28)
∑
j
vHjt = (rH + δH)Ht
Trade (constant sectoral import and export shares):
(A-29) giMt = giM Ait/Ai
(A-30) giXt = giX Ait/Ai
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